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CORPORATIONS
DAVID Y. MOxTExiH II*
Cases
Three cases dealt with corporate questions during the survey
period. None is so startling in its holding as to require detailed
treatment.
The first of these cases dealt with the jurisdiction of the com-
mon pleas court over a foreign corporation when the subject
matter of the action was not within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Gibbs v. Young1 the plaintiff, a resident of California,
brought an action for injuries arising out of a collision in the
state of Georgia. In the action, the plaintiff joined a foreign
corporation authorized to do business in South Carolina and an
authorized agent of that corporation.
The corporate defendant demurred to the complaint on the
ground that, as to it, there was no jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter of the action. The trial court overruled the demurrer.
The South Carolina Code provides:
An Action against a corporation created by or under the
laws of any other state, government or county may be
brought in the circuit court . . . (2) by a plaintiff not a
resident of this State when the cause of action shall have
arisen or the subject matter of the action shall be situate
within this State.
2
On appeal, there was no question that the jurisdiction over
the person of the individual defendant and the corporation was
valid; nor was there any doubt that the court had the right to
entertain the transitory cause of action against the agent, because
the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and person of
the individual defendant.
The question presented by these facts was whether the joinder
of an individual defendant, over whom the court had jurisdiction
of both the person and the subject matter, gave the court juris-
diction as to the corporation, over whom the court had jurisdic-
tion of the person only. No previous authority was available on
this specific point.
* Member, South Carolina Bar; Associate, Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl,
New York.
1. 242 S.C. 217, 130 S.E.2d 484 (1963).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-214 (1962).
1
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In an opinion by Mr. Justice Bussey, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court unanimously held that the joinder of the individual
defendant did not give jurisdiction over the corporation. The
court reaffirmed the principle that its jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter of an action depends upon the authority granted it
by the constitution and the laws of the state. Because of his over-
riding principle and the clear prohibition of the statute, the
demurrer should have been sustained.
In Reedy 'v. Alderman3 the court was faced with a problem
which will not be likely to arise under the corporation statute
now in effect. In that case, two factions of a bank's shareholders
held equal shares. The board of directors, at the time of the 1962
meeting, was composed of seven members elected by one faction
and two members elected by the other faction. The shareholder
factions were deadlocked because the faction with only two di-
rectors on the board insisted on a greater proportional repre-
sentation on the board. This could only have been accomplished
by reducing the boards' membership. The articles of incorpora-
tion did not provide for the number of directors to be on the
board and no agreement was reached.
Because of the inability of the shareholders to elect a new
board, the old board held over as provided in the bank's by-laws.
Successive motions to re-elect the present directors or to elect
nine directors failed because of a tie vote. A motion to adjourn
until the shareholders should decide to reconvene, or until the
next meeting, or until ordered to do so by a court was finally
passed.
The faction with two directors brought a petition for a writ
of mandamus, ordering that the two factions hold a meeting and
elect directors by cumulative balloting. The court below held
that the writ did not lie and the petitioners appealed.
On appeal, the court adhered to the long established principle
that mandamus will lie only to compel performance of a non-
discretionary duty. The determination of the number of directors
is not a non-discretionary duty, and a court cannot compel a de-
cision to be made. Although cumulative voting is a non-discre-
tionary act that the court can compel to be performed, there
could not, of necessity, be a vote by cumulative ballot until the
number of directors to be elected is decided. Until the discre-
tionary act is performed, there can be no enforcement of the non-
discretionary act.
3. 242 S.C. 552, 131 S.E.2d 689 (1963).
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There is little likelihood that the problem of this case will
arise under the 1962 South Carolina Corporation Law. The 1962
law requires that the number of directors be fixed by the articles
of incorporation. 4 Changes in the number of directors may be
made by: (1) amending the articles; (2) new by-laws adopted
by the shareholders; and (3) action of the board of directors
pursuant to shareholder action.5
The third case, Lawson v. Jeter,6 is a reaffirmation of the
principle that the relationship of buyer and seller is not that of
agent and principal, as such, so as to allow valid service of proc-
ess on the seller through the buyer. Since the finding by the
lower court that there was no jurisdiction was not manifestly
erroneous, the judgment was affirmed.
Statutes
In the 1964 session, the general assembly amended several
sections of the 1962 Business Corporation Act.7 The amendments
are generally technical in nature and concern delivery of docu-
ments for filing, informal or irregular action by shareholders,
pre-emptive rights, and sale of assets in other than the regular
course of business.
A further enactment dealt with eliminating the requirement
that the names of building and loan associations and savings and
loan associations contain words indicative of corporate status.8
4. S.C. C(DE ANN. §§ 12-14.3(a) (5), -18.3(a) (1962).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.3(b) (1-3) (1962).
6. 243 S.C. 103, 132 S.E.2d 276 (1963).
7. S.C. ACTS & 3. RES. 1964, Nos. 771, 823, 1074.
8. S.C. AcTs & 3. RES. 1964, No. 849. Other amendments affecting savings
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